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7This paper examines the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel 
and the role it plays in Israeli politics to better understand its role in Israeli 
Arab society. The Northern Islamic Movement is a movement that focuses 
mainly on socio-religious activities in the Israeli Arab communities, but also 
exhibits goals, rhetoric, and functions with strong political undertones. Thus, 
the Northern Branch is often understood to pose a comprehensive challenge 
to the state of Israel in social, political, and economic terms, and raises 
questions of a democratic dilemma.1 This view is restrictive in its assumption 
of a zero-sum situation in Israel, where a policy or event benefiting the 
Arab minority negatively impacts the Jewish citizenry and vice versa. The 
analytical framework proposed and developed here is the concept of ‘socio-
political entrepreneurship’. While the notion of entrepreneurship originated 
in the field of economics, it has also taken hold in the social sciences as ‘social 
entrepreneurship’ and ‘political entrepreneurship’. Social entrepreneurship 
refers to initiatives taken to ameliorate social issues through economic means, 
while political entrepreneurship describes the way in which policies are 
changed in unexpected ways, generally at high levels of government. However, 
there is a gap in which the literature fails to explain social entrepreneurship 
with political undertones, 
or the case of the politician 
as social entrepreneur. 
This paper proposes the 
concept, and various 
aspects of, ‘socio-political 
entrepreneurship’, which 
combines elements 
of social and political 
entrepreneurship. The 
aim of socio-political 
entrepreneurship is to 
work on behalf of society to 
improve social conditions; 
“This paper proposes 
the concept, and 
various aspects 
of, ‘socio-political 
entrepreneurship’...”
introductionabStract
This paper examines the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel 
by using ‘socio-political entrepreneurship’ as the analytical framework. 
While the notion of entrepreneurship originated in the field of economics, 
it has also taken hold in the social sciences as ‘social entrepreneurship’ and 
‘political entrepreneurship’. Social entrepreneurship refers to initiatives 
taken to ameliorate social issues through economic means, while political 
entrepreneurship describes the way in which policies are changed in 
unexpected ways, generally at high levels of government. However, there is 
a gap in which the literature fails to explain social entrepreneurship with 
political undertones, or the case of the politician as social entrepreneur. 
This paper proposes the concept, and various aspects of, ‘socio-political 
entrepreneurship’, which combines elements of social and political 
entrepreneurship. The aim of socio-political entrepreneurship is to work 
on behalf of society to improve social conditions; while this has political 
undertones, the enterprise need not necessarily, or exclusively, be about 
changing politics. The Northern Islamic Movement is a social and religious 
movement that focuses mainly on socio-religious activities in the Israeli Arab 
communities, but also exhibits goals, rhetoric, and functions with strong 
political undertones. Thus, the use of ‘socio-political entrepreneurship’ allows 
for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the functions of the Northern 
Islamic Movement in Israeli Arab society.
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9Critical Aspects of the Entrepreneur in Economic Theory
The Person/Entity Who Assumes Risk and/or Uncertainty
Richard Cantillon established the entrepreneur as one who assumes risk 
and/or uncertainty, describing uncertainty as all those ‘unknowable’ things 
inherent in the economic market.2 Another crucial development in the theory 
of uncertainty and risk in entrepreneurship emerged in Frank Knight’s work. 
He argued that the entrepreneur assumes the consequences of uncertainty 
and risk.3 According to Knight, management does not imply entrepreneurship, 
but a manager becomes an entrepreneur when his work requires exercising 
‘judgment involving liability to error’.4 One of Knight’s most important 
contributions was to clearly distinguish between the concepts of insurable risk 
and non-insurable uncertainty. Knight wrote that ‘risk’ refers to a measurable 
quantity, i.e. the objective probability that an event will happen. On the other 
hand, ‘uncertainty’, often confused with risk, is an unmeasurable factor such 
as the inability to predict consumer demand.5 Other writers who agreed with 
Cantillon’s and Knight’s assessment that risk and uncertainty are defining 
aspects of entrepreneurship are Johann Heinrich von Thünen (1960), Hans 
von Mangoldt (1987), Frederick Hawley (1892), Herbert Davenport (1913), 
Ludwig von Mises (1949), Arthur Cole (1949), and George L.S. Shackle (1955).
An Innovator
Most modern theories of entrepreneurship take their origin from Joseph 
Schumpeter’s seminal work, which had been foreshadowed by Abbe Nicolas 
Baudeau’s theory of the innovative entrepreneur.6 Schumpeter argued that 
the entrepreneur is principally an innovator: an individual who creates a 
new good or quality; creates a new production method; opens a new market; 
captures a new supply source; or creates a new organization or industry.7 The 
entrepreneur is the main instrument of change, the one who disturbs the status 
quo through a process of ‘creative destruction’. Per Schumpeter, ‘everyone is an 
entrepreneur only when he actually “carries out new combinations,” and loses 
that character as soon as he has built up his business, when he settles down 
to running it as other people run their businesses’.8 Following Schumpeter, 
Jeremy Bentham (1952), Johann Heinrich von Thünen (1960), and Israel 
Kirzner (1985) also emphasized the entrepreneur’s innovative qualities as 
important in the development of human progress.
A Decision Maker
Until the beginning of the 1950s, the standard textbook definition of the 
entrepreneur’s function was that of ‘making fundamental policy decisions in an 
enterprise’.9 Carl Menger wrote that economic change arises from individuals’ 
understanding of circumstances, not the circumstances themselves. His 
while this has political undertones, 
the enterprise need not necessarily, 
or exclusively, be about changing 
politics. The benefit of studying 
a socio-political movement as an 
enterprise allows attention to shift 
from the zero-sum model to more 
productive questions that allow 
for a deeper and more nuanced 
understanding of its roles and 
functions.
There is a wide and varied literature 
on the study of entrepreneurship, 
in which definitions and aspects 
of the concepts are sometimes 
vague or contradictory. Regardless, 
some overarching themes have 
emerged. Traditionally, scholars 
have analysed the entrepreneur 
as operating within an economic 
market, but more recently, 
theories of social and political 
entrepreneurship have been 
developed and applied within 
the broader social science field. 
Following is a concise review 
of the seminal ideas of classical 
economic entrepreneurship, 
grouped into one of six overarching 
themes, and a brief overview of the 
contributions of social and political 
entrepreneurship theories.
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“The benefit 
of studying a 
socio-political 
movement as 
an enterprise 
allows attention 
to shift from 
the zero-sum 
model to more 
productive 
questions...”
theory relies on the role of knowledge 
in individual decisions, and thus his 
entrepreneur’s function is to use his 
calculating and decision-making 
abilities to align productive resources 
over time.10 Friedrich von Wieser 
expanded on this, writing that the 
entrepreneur directs an economic 
enterprise and that ‘he supplies 
not only the necessary capital but 
originates the idea, elaborates and 
puts into operation the plan, and 
engages collaborators’.11 Other 
authors whose work attributes 
decision-making qualities to the 
entrepreneur are Alfred Marshall 
(1920), Amasa Walker (1866) and his 
son, Francis Amasa Walker (1876), 
Arthur Cole (1949), George L.S. 
Shackle (1955), and Theodore Schultz 
(1975).
A Leader
Historically, entrepreneurship has 
been consistently associated with 
leadership. In the earliest literature, 
royalty, military leaders, and 
even merchants were considered 
entrepreneurial because they 
subjected themselves to risk in a way 
that others did not, and positioned 
themselves to gain significant 
political, personal, or economic 
benefits.12 Various classical authors 
have described the entrepreneur as 
a leader in some form, whether as 
manager, superintendent, organizer, 
employer, or contractor. John Stuart 
Mill established the entrepreneur as a 
manager or superintendent – one who 
has direction and control over the 
enterprise.13 Leon Walras similarly 
characterized the entrepreneur as the 
coordinator of resources.14 François 
Quesnay’s entrepreneur is the 
independent owner of a business, one 
who ‘manages and makes his business 
profitable’.15 Jean-Baptiste Say (1840) 
described the entrepreneur as the 
manager of a firm, yet separate from 
the capitalist. He also wrote that the 
entrepreneur’s most distinguishing 
quality is to have ‘good judgment’, 
a term closely associated with 
leadership today.16 Von Wieser (1927), 
Amasa and Francis Walker (1866 and 
1876), Bentham (1952), Marshall 
(1920), Menger (1950), Davenport 
(1913), and Schumpeter (1947) 
express similar ideas in their work.
The Supplier of Capital
Adam Smith divided entrepreneurs 
into three categories: the adventurer, 
the projector, and the undertaker.17 In 
his treatment of ‘the undertaker’, he 
established the entrepreneur as the 
person who supplies financial capital. 
Smith considered the undertaker to 
be a ‘prudent man’.18 Importantly, 
Smith’s prudent man accumulates 
capital because he is frugal; in this 
way, he encourages slow but steady 
progress. Ludwig von Mises (1949) 
and Amme-Robert Jacques Turgot 
(1977) are among other scholars 
who emphasize that entrepreneurs 
supply financial capital, and most 
contemporary work assumes this 
attribute. 
Notably, Turgot’s contribution was 
to establish capital ownership as a 
separate economic function. He wrote 
that a capitalist does not need to be an entrepreneur, but that one cannot be 
an entrepreneur without being a capitalist.19 
‘Who’ May Be an Entrepreneur?
The literature on entrepreneurship generally agrees that the term 
‘entrepreneur’ may be applied widely to various actors and is not restricted 
to economics or to a single person. Cantillon (1931), von Mises (1949), and 
Theodore Schultz (1975) argued that the entrepreneur may be any person 
who must make choices and deal with uncertainties, qualities which may 
apply to persons as diverse as students, consumers, beggars, home-makers, or 
any labourer reallocating his or her services, time, or efforts. This idea allows 
for a broader interpretation of the entrepreneur beyond, for example, one 
who faces economic risk in a business. Amasa Walker (1866) and Jeff Skoll 
(2006) agree with these assessments, and more recent work has established 
that even a government may be entrepreneurial.20 Regarding whether the 
entrepreneur is one person, a group of people, or an organization, Fredrik 
Barth agreed with Schumpeter that the entrepreneur is not necessarily ‘a 
single physical person’ and that ‘every social environment has its own ways of 
filling the entrepreneurial function’.21 More specifically, Barth wrote that the 
word describes ‘an aspect of a role: it relates to actions and activities, … [and] 
it characterises a certain quality’.22 This means that ‘being an entrepreneur’ 
refers to a person’s, group’s, or organization’s function rather than their 
identity.
Contributions of Social and Political Entrepreneurship Theories
Schumpeter offered some early insight into the entrepreneur’s relationship 
with society, writing that entrepreneurial functions involve the ‘will power 
adequate to break down the resistance that the social environment offers 
to change.’ In this way, entrepreneurial activity ‘extends to the structure 
and the very foundations of … society’.23 Charles Wilson added that 
entrepreneurs are involved in a process of ‘social amelioration’, a concept that 
has carried through to present day analyses of social entrepreneurs.24 This 
introduction of entrepreneurs’ role in society gave rise to the development 
of social entrepreneurship theory in the mid-1950s. Cyril Belshaw wrote that 
entrepreneurs both represent and influence the direction of social change, 
because ‘their values and methods are a reflection of the synthesis between 
old and new that is the developing culture’.25 
Barth gave rise to further discussion of the social entrepreneur with his 
more precise explanation of how an entrepreneur functions in terms of 
social change. He built on the idea of community cooperation, writing that 
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Towards a Theory of Socio-
Political Entrepreneurship
The following question, which 
arises throughout the literature 
on entrepreneurship, needs to be 
answered: What happens when the 
politician is a social entrepreneur 
or when social entrepreneurship 
has political undertones? Despite 
the plurality of work on political 
entrepreneurs, and of course the 
wealth of discussion on all aspects of 
the economic entrepreneur, the idea 
of the politician as social entrepreneur 
remains underdeveloped. One 
possible way to address this is to 
revise the concepts of social and 
political entrepreneurship and 
propose the idea of ‘socio-political 
entrepreneurship’. 
Social entrepreneurship describes 
initiatives taken on behalf of 
the betterment of social issues 
through economic means. Political 
entrepreneurship has been developed 
as a concept through which 
policies are changed in unexpected 
ways, generally at high levels of 
government. A synthesis of these two 
concepts allows for the analysis of 
entrepreneurs who work on behalf of 
society to improve social conditions, 
and whose efforts may have political 
undertones but are not necessarily, 
or exclusively, about changing 
politics. This approach builds on the 
overarching themes of economic 
entrepreneurship and aspects of 
social and political entrepreneurship 
described above.
To encapsulate the dimensions of 
socio-political entrepreneurship, 
these criteria are proposed:
a) Assumption of risk and/or 
uncertainty – The entrepreneur 
assumes the risk and/or uncertainty 
of the enterprise. The enterprise’s 
viability depends on the members’ 
efforts and their ability to secure 
resources, as well as prudent 
management of capital.
b) Innovation – In keeping with 
the foundational scholarship 
on entrepreneurship, the socio-
political enterprise must be able 
to distinguish itself from similar 
or related undertakings with 
a characteristic that is new or 
different. 
c) Autonomy in decision-making 
– The enterprise is created 
and governed by a group of 
people/citizens undertaking 
an autonomous project. The 
enterprise is not managed, either 
directly or indirectly, by any other 
organization or authority, whether 
private or governmental. Thus, 
the enterprise may formulate its 
positions and organise its actions 
freely, as well as terminate the 
undertaking.
d) Leadership – The entrepreneur 
displays leadership qualities 
within his enterprise by managing, 
organising, and directing other 
members. Similarly, the enterprise 
may take on a leadership role in the 
community.
e) Supplying capital – The 
entrepreneur supplies the 
capital necessary to produce the 
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a ‘corporate group’ will arise around the entrepreneur which is new in terms 
of membership, function, or composition and structure. This definition of 
the word entrepreneur ‘leads us directly to highly seminal points of social 
change’.26 However, the social entrepreneur depends on the approval of others 
to succeed: ‘Despite the awareness of its needs, a society may … be hostile to 
the means with which the innovator wishes to satisfy them’.27 This drives the 
entrepreneur to undergo the process of ‘constructive destruction’28 : a concept 
describing the process by which the entrepreneur ‘destroys important social 
organisms that a given society wishes to but is unable to protect’.29 
Another important aspect of social entrepreneurship is the ability to capture 
‘the active cooperation of considerable segments of the population’.30 Barth 
wrote that entrepreneurs recognise and develop a ‘set of needs in a population 
which places clients in the strongest relation of dependence to himself’. In 
this way, clients begin to view those needs as vital, and the entrepreneur ‘can 
present himself as singularly qualified and able to cater for precisely [those] 
needs’.31 These aspects imply a type of dependency-provision cycle between the 
entrepreneur and society, in which the entrepreneur is in a position to be the 
best, or main, provider of some type of good or service which society requires.
Political scientists have defined political entrepreneurs as ‘individuals 
who change the direction and flow of politics’.32 Political entrepreneurship 
occurs ‘when an individual acts on a political profit opportunity’.33 The 
concept of opportunity and the concept of the profit motive have emerged 
as important to consider. Further, the function of a political entrepreneur is 
here understood in ‘terms related to policy success and status’.34 Holcombe 
writes that ‘entrepreneurial opportunities arise in politics for many of the 
same reasons that they appear in markets, to reduce the inefficiency. … If the 
political system is unstable … then change is more likely’.35
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“These aspects imply a 
type of dependency-
provision cycle between the 
entrepreneur and society...”
ideological crisis for Israeli Arabs 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
leaving them to search for new 
socio-political identities.42 Israeli 
Arabs could not join the political 
sphere in Israel like their Jewish 
counterparts, but their limited 
citizenship status nevertheless 
allowed them to function within 
the legal framework of the state, 
and Arab leaders made clear that 
they ‘would act only within the 
law’.43 Under the direction of Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, 
who advocated that the resource 
disparity for Israeli Arabs needed 
to cease, some progress towards 
parity was made. However, Rabin 
was assassinated in November 
1995 by a right-wing extremist 
who opposed the Oslo Accords.44 
Since then, it seems that the state 
has not allowed Arabs to exercise 
their citizenship rights beyond 
a certain limit, which is ‘located 
at the transition point between 
struggling to have their liberal 
rights respected, even expanded, 
in the conduct of official policy 
and attempting to challenge the 
prevailing notion of the common 
good of society.’45 
Beginnings of the Islamic 
Movement 
The Islamic Movement emerged in 
the Negev region of Israel and is 
one of the leading political forces 
in Israeli Arab society today.46 
Following the June 1967 Six Day 
War, Israeli Arabs and Palestinians 
in the occupied territories renewed 
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“Israeli Arabs 
could not join 
the political 
sphere in Israel 
like their Jewish 
counterparts, 
but their limited 
citizenship status 
nevertheless 
allowed them to 
function within the 
legal framework 
of the state...”
enterprise’s services. This can be 
in the form of physical, financial, 
human, or social capital. 
f) Involvement in social development 
– The socio-political entrepreneur 
principally aims to serve society, 
or a part of society, in some way. 
The enterprise encourages local-
level social responsibility and 
engagement.
g) Demonstrable cooperation of 
society – The enterprise functions 
with, and actively encourages, the 
support of the society in which 
it operates. The participation of 
members of society is crucial to the 
success of the enterprise’s goals.
h) Dependency-provision cycle – 
In the socio-political enterprise, 
the entrepreneur has identified a 
particular need in society and has 
engineered a way to position the 
enterprise as the sole, main, or best 
provider of the solution to those 
needs. In this way, society becomes 
dependent on the services provided 
by the entrepreneur.
i) A combination of political and 
social objectives, formal or informal 
– Importantly, socio-political 
entrepreneurship distinguishes 
itself from social entrepreneurship 
and political entrepreneurship 
in that it combines elements of 
both. As such, the socio-political 
enterprise may be a social enterprise 
with political undertones, or it may 
be a political enterprise with a 
heavy emphasis on social services.
The Northern Islamic Movement 
as Case Study for Socio-Political 
Entrepreneurship
The Development of the Islamic 
Movement: The Socio-Political 
Context of the Arabs in Israel
Israel is a country with a Jewish 
majority and an Arab minority, 
comprising roughly 75 percent and 
25 percent respectively.36 While 
Arabs are granted basic rights, they 
are not offered equality because the 
state gives symbolic, structural and 
practical preference to its Jewish 
citizens.37 Welfare services, land 
allocation, educational institutions 
and the economic development of 
communities for Arabs differ from 
those in the Jewish communities.38 
Thus, Israel’s Arab population has 
not been given admission to full 
membership in Israeli society, but 
rather false and unequal integration.39 
This demonstrates the failure of 
secular Israeli politics to address the 
grievances of all its citizens.
Israeli Arabs desire civil and political, 
if not cultural, integration with the 
Jewish majority, and are not satisfied 
with the place they have been given 
within Israel’s society.40 While the 
Palestinians in the territories were 
progressing towards their right to 
self-determination, the Arabs in 
Israel had made no progress towards 
their goals.41 In addition, the failure 
of Pan-Arabism, the decline of Arab 
nationalism in the 1970s, and the blow 
the fall of the Soviet Union dealt to 
the Arab Communist Party created an 
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their relations, and religiosity increased in the Israeli Arab communities.47 
One of the persons influenced by this transition was Sheikh Darwish from 
the Little Triangle region. Initially active in the Communist Party, he shifted 
to Islam as an ideological and political framework for action in the mid-
1960s. He began preaching in Kafr Qassem, and the Islamic Movement began 
in 1972 when he gained his first followers. Darwish’s reputation spread to 
neighbouring villages and by 1978 his influence could be traced as far away 
as the Bedouin settlements of the Negev and Galilee. His ideology at the time 
was based on two positions: antipathy to western imperialism and culture, 
and the ‘understanding of Islam as the most complete, liberal, and humanist 
way to life’. Because of this, his sermons attracted those who felt alienated 
from and discriminated against by Israeli society and who were searching 
for identity.48 Initially, the activists followed a pattern of ‘Islamization from 
above’, which meant that the movement was organized into militant groups 
that aimed to destroy the dominant Israeli-Jewish order. The group comprised 
approximately 60-100 lower middle class male activists, most under the age of 
25, lacking higher education, and all from the same region as Darwish. However, 
some of the movement’s members were arrested in early 1981, and several, 
including Darwish, served prison sentences for inciting violence against the 
state. After Darwish’s release in 1983, he declared that the movement would 
henceforth avoid public calls to establish a Muslim state and that it would act 
within Israeli law. Since then, the Islamic Movement has followed a process 
of ‘Islamization from below’ in which it concentrates on social, cultural, 
religious, and educational services.49 
In 1996, the movement split on various grounds, but the most significant and 
divisive one was the issue of participation in Israel’s Knesset (parliamentary) 
elections. The two factions of the Islamic Movement are now known as 
the ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ branches, names which have little to do with 
geographic differences.50 The Southern Branch strives to achieve equality 
through negotiations or by pressuring the state to allocate resources to improve 
Israeli Arabs’ status and condition, follows traditional and conservative 
ideologies, and has participated in Knesset elections since 1996. In contrast, 
the Northern Branch follows a more Islamist position, does not participate in 
Knesset elections, and has constructed independent institutions separate from 
the state in order to provide essential services to Arab communities.51 One 
plausible explanation for the Northern Branch’s decision not to participate 
in Knesset elections is that their participation in the elections would signify 
recognition of Israeli sovereignty.52 The Northern Branch has argued that 
election participation would be a violation of the Islamic faith because ‘the 
Knesset represents the principle of human sovereignty while Islamic faith 
recognizes only the sovereignty of Allah’.53 In this dissertation, the focus of 
study going forward is the Northern 
Branch because its non-participation 
in state governing institutions 
presents an interesting case study 
regarding the success of its socio-
political entrepreneurial role within 
Israeli Arab society.
Aspects of the Northern Islamic 
Movement Today
The Leadership and Its Rhetoric
The Islamic Movement’s leadership 
initially comprised well-educated 
young men such as Sheikh Darwish, 
Ra’ed Salah, Kamal Rayyan, Kamal 
Khatib, and other distinguished 
activists motivated to change 
the conditions of the Israeli Arab 
communities.54 Little is known about 
the Movement’s early organizational 
structure and institutions as it was 
not registered as a political party 
and its members had no formal 
status. When the Movement became 
institutionalized in the late 1980s, 
it established the supreme body 
known as the Advisory Council 
(majlis shura), elected by the general 
conference (mu’tamar ‘aam), whose 
members represent towns in which 
the Movement is active. Senior 
officials in the Israeli General 
Security Service have stated that 
‘the Islamic Movement presumably 
maintains several covert cells’, 
which the Movement denies but 
which would be consistent with the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational 
structure. Still, the Movement derives 
great strength from its lawful, overt 
actions, and has carefully exploited 
the actions available to it within the 
confines of the state of Israel.55 
Among the leadership there are some 
contradictions and nuanced rhetoric 
regarding the state. On the one 
hand, the Movement’s publications 
recognise Israel and its right to exist, 
and leaders such as Sheikh Darwish 
stress that ‘publicly and audibly, we 
recognize the State of Israel’. On 
the other hand, some leaders treat 
affiliation with Israel as a ‘default 
option’; Kamel Khatib for example has 
stated: ‘We will not consent to being 
assimilated into the Israeli milieu, 
not ideologically, not politically, and 
certainly not culturally. In no way 
does the Israeli milieu represent us’.56 
This shows a stronger resistance 
to the state and the inequalities it 
represents, as well as a rejection 
of what it currently means for 
Arabs to be Israeli. Two of the main 
slogans used by the Movement, al-
Islam huwa al-hall (‘Islam is the 
solution’) and al-Islam huwa al-
badil (‘Islam is the alternative’), 
refer to the organization’s belief 
that they represent an alternative to 
Western culture, Zionist occupation, 
and the oppression and identity 
crisis of Israeli Arabs.57 Sheikh 
Salah in particular is now one of the 
most vocal leaders of the Islamic 
Movement and is often described as 
charismatic. His rallying slogans are 
certainly emotive, perhaps meant 
to attract financial support for the 
Movement from other parts of the 
Muslim world.58 Salah’s ‘Al-Aqsa in 
Danger’ project, and the rhetoric and 
16 17
To quote Salah, the movement seeks ‘to mix between the Islamic sources 
and the sharp political vision’, which indicates a readiness to compromise, 
and a ‘desire to find solutions which would enable the movement to find a 
bridge between the teachings of Islam and the existing political situation in 
Israel’.68 The phrase ‘sharp political vision’ indicates that Salah may have a 
greater political agenda beyond just providing services to the communities. 
Kedar’s work comprehensively reviews the Northern Branch’s goals based on 
the Movement’s weekly newspaper, its women’s monthly publication, books 
written by members, sermons, and his own conversations with Movement 
leaders.69 
In summary, Kedar argues that the Northern Branch’s main message is that 
the state of Israel is illegitimate, and that the struggle against it and its culture 
is necessary. Salah’s al-mujtama al-isami is, in this view, only a temporary 
solution ‘designed as an alternative to the state and to the liberal worldview 
that it has injected into the Islamic community’ while a more comprehensive 
struggle against the state is not feasible.70 Rekhess agrees that the Movement’s 
goals are complex; although progress was slow, it was in no hurry and had 
adopted ‘a gradual, reformist approach’, due to its long-term vision.71
Services Provided by the Northern Islamic Movement
Between 1972 and 1996, the Islamic Movement caused a ‘fundamental 
transformation in the worldview and lifestyle’ of Israeli Arabs, transforming 
the traditional and conservative yet secular society into one that adopted 
an Islamic lifestyle identity.72 The Movement’s network of organizations, 
institutions, and volunteer organizations are duly registered with the state, 
and offer practical solutions to social issues insufficiently addressed by the 
government.73 The short sections below discuss the Movement’s work in 
da’wah, education, infrastructure, healthcare, charity, and sports, culture, and 
the arts. 
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activities that accompany it, have 
been very effective instruments for 
recruiting support for the Movement. 
The significance of the sacred place 
(discussed in more detail later) and 
its transformation from merely 
a religious to the more powerful 
national symbol, have gained support 
from many, including non-Muslims.59 
Although Salah has served multiple 
prison sentences for inciting violence 
in some of his speeches (such as 
calling for the Al-Aqsa mosque to be 
defended ‘in spirit and blood’), his 
rhetoric is fascinating. He is known to 
use an ‘intriguing blend of Islamism, 
Palestinian nationalism, and denial 
of Israel’s hegemony’.60 
Goals of the Northern Islamic 
Movement
The Islamic Movement is ‘a religious, 
political, and social movement’, 
focused mainly on socio-religious 
activities.61 Its primary ideological 
sources stem from Muslim 
Brotherhood writings, including 
those of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid 
Qutb, and Hasan al-Hudaybi.62 
When the Islamic Movement 
became organised in its newly de-
radicalised form in the early 1980s, it 
‘rush[ed] in to provide the essential 
services to individuals where the 
government … failed to do so’ in 
the Israeli Arab communities.63 To 
address government insufficiencies, 
the Northern Branch adopted the 
‘autonomy model’ proposed by Salah. 
He proposed the establishment 
of al-mujtama al-isami, a self-
sustaining community which would 
be able to provide for itself, using 
its own resources to provide several 
comprehensive services. This type of 
community would not be dependent 
on the Israeli state and thus would 
not suffer from socio-economic 
sanctions. The Arab community 
could then ‘administer their lives in 
an autonomous, sovereign manner, in 
the spirit of Islam’.64 Another of the 
Movement’s major aims has been to 
encourage Muslims to become more 
devout; through youth education, 
community programs, and social 
activism the Movement attains great 
community support while stressing 
Islamic teachings.65 In this way, it has 
to a great extent followed Muslim 
Brotherhood goals of building an 
Islamic society.66 The state of Israel 
wishes to preserve its Jewish character 
and prevent religious and national 
separatism, however, and thus a 
major obstacle to the implementation 
of Salah’s plans has been government 
acts against the Movement’s 
social institutions and financial 
mechanisms. Besides humanitarian 
support, the Movement was also 
accused of helping Hamas commit 
terrorist attacks; the individuals 
carrying out these attacks were likely 
not directed by the movement even 
though they identified with it.67 
It would be a mistake, however, to 
assume that the future vision of 
the Northern Islamic Movement is 
simply al-mujtama al-isami. While 
this has been a short-term goal, the 
Movement’s longer-term political 
goals may be more far-reaching. 
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Da’wah – Da‘wah activities can include sermons, religious studies, public 
rallies, educational camps, distribution of religious books, and publication 
of manifestos, opinion papers, and newsletters, all of which the Islamic 
Movement has exploited. Local Movement-operated ‘da‘wah committees’ 
perfected their operative methods over the years. In 1992, the Movement first 
held a ‘da’wah week’, during which dozens of young people visited homes 
in the town of Umm al-Fahm with the purpose of inspiring residents to re-
embrace Islam. The Movement expanded its da’wah activities after that, and 
since then societal life gradually changed as it ‘Islamized’. Young people 
increasingly wore traditional conservative dress, and the consumption of 
religious literature surged. In addition, mosques became more popular, both 
as places of worship and as central community centres.74 Another part of the 
Movement’s da’wah activity has been its call for Muslims to reclaim all Islamic 
endowment assets to strengthen Israeli Arabs’ historical and cultural heritage. 
There is special attention to protecting the al-Aqsa mosque (discussed in 
greater detail later).75 
Education – In the field of education, the Islamic Movement took the opportunity 
to fill a void created by government neglect, particularly in pre-school services 
as well as complementary and higher education services. The importance that 
the Islamic Movement attributed to this reflects the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
emphasis on education as a ‘primary tool for developing the faith of Muslim 
individuals … and as a mechanism for recruiting new members’.76 To address 
the lack of adequate educational services, the Islamic Movement established 
a network of subsidized kindergartens and day care centres that provided 
free meals and organized transportation. It also organized summer camps 
featuring outdoor activities, field trips to tourist and Islamic sites, prayer 
studies, lectures, and choral activities. The Movement’s curriculum combines 
Arab nationalism with religion, while encouraging excellence in education.77 
Pre-school educational institutions are offered in 86% of Arab villages and 
are funded by charitable donations from the community.78 To complement 
state-run elementary and secondary education institutions, the Movement 
offers a system in primary and secondary education that assists students who 
are weak in mathematics and English, and gives computer, internet, Quran 
and hadith lessons and helps students prepare for matriculation exams.79 The 
public’s response was overwhelmingly positive.
One of the greatest achievements in the field of higher education was the 
1985 establishment of the College of Da‘wah and Islamic Sciences (Kuliyyat 
al-Da‘wah wal-‘Ulum al-Islamiyyah). Here, the Movement trained Islamic 
religious officials and allowed it to partially fill the void in advanced religious 
instruction. The Movement also established the Centre of Contemporary 
Studies (Markaz al-Dirasat al-
Mu‘aasirah), a research institution 
which published an Islamic journal as 
well as regular scientific publications. 
The Islamic Movement initiated the 
Students Committee, which awarded 
scholarships and recruited students 
for volunteer activities.80 
Infrastructure – Annual volunteer 
infrastructure work camps have 
been organized to conform to 
regular schedules of activity. Many 
volunteers, mostly young people, 
from around the country staffed 
these projects that worked to pave or 
widen roads and sidewalks, renovate 
schools, and construct classrooms 
and playgrounds.81 Other activities 
included building and renovating 
mosques, cleaning and repairing 
cemeteries, constructing covered 
bus stops, and building security 
fences around public buildings. 
These activities had very minimal 
monetary cost because labour and 
materials were donated, while results 
were immediately visible on the 
ground.82  In addition, the work camps 
fostered pan-Islamic solidarity and 
brotherhood among the Arab youth. 
These activities have increased the 
popularity of the Movement among 
the Arab community, and even 
those who are not members of the 
Movement have contributed to it.83 
Healthcare – In this area the Movement 
activated an umbrella organization 
called the Association of Islamic 
Clinics, which oversaw a network 
of local clinics that offered general, 
expert, and dentistry services, and 
in some cases even night services 
and their own medical insurance.84 
Services offered at these clinics 
included, for example, 24-hour on-
call service, outpatient treatments, 
internists and family physicians, basic 
cardiology equipment, an ambulance, 
and emergency dental treatments. 
The Movement also organized a 
‘health week’ in several towns during 
which the clinics offered free check-
ups, treatments, consultations, and 
informational lectures.85 
Charity – In keeping with its Islamic 
character, the Movement collected 
alms and charity (zakat and sadaqa) 
for those in need. It organized 
committees that collected charitable 
donations, as well as Ramadan 
payments (fitrah) and kindergarten 
and day care tuition payments. 
These funds were used to support 
the needy or to fund the Movement’s 
many communal projects; funds were 
earmarked for charity associations, 
nursing services for the elderly, 
financial assistance for marriage and 
other expenses for the needy, home 
renovations for welfare recipients, 
and even a campaign against the 
abuse of alcohol and drugs.86 The 
charitable, Islamic character of these 
services, as well as their affordability, 
have increased the Movement’s 
prestige and popularity. The fact 
that the Northern Branch undertook 
these projects without official help 
stood in great contrast to the poor 
performance of state bodies, and 
thus both its leader and its objectives 
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received vast public support and 
admiration.87 
Sports, Culture and the Arts – One 
of the Movement’s first initiatives 
was to establish the Islamic Sports 
Association, which includes an 
Islamic football league separate 
from the Israeli league.88 The 
Movement also opened martial 
arts clubs and organized classes 
in judo and karate.89 In addition, 
the Movement conducted music, 
theatre and literature activities. It 
established choirs which performed 
at its rallies, summer camps, work 
camps, and weddings, and which 
played traditional instruments. 
The Movement’s Islamic Theatre 
operated throughout various 
regions, and performed plays 
containing political themes and 
social issues. The Movement 
established the Association of 
Islamic Libraries, which opened 
over thirty functioning libraries 
that operated in Islamic cultural 
centres and were registered as 
non-profit organizations. Further, 
book stores (also registered as non-
profit organizations) and book fairs 
were established by the Movement, 
as well as its women’s monthly and 
a weekly newspaper, Sawt al-Haqq 
wal-Huriyyah.90 
Overall, the Islamic Movement was 
immensely successful in garnering 
support through its various 
initiatives and programmes. Public 
opinion polls of the last decade 
show that the Islamist stream of 
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both factions is one of the strongest political streams in Arab society. According 
to the annual survey of Israeli Arab opinion, public identification with the 
Islamic Movement as the faithful representative of the Arab minority in Israel 
is very strong.91 Additional evidence of this is the massive participation in the 
annual rallies that the Northern Branch organises. Unofficial estimates show 
that ‘tens of thousands of individuals’ attend these rallies; more than any other 
popular gathering sponsored by an Arab party. Presumably the major reason 
for such high attendance is that the Movement focuses rallies on religious 
issues with strong national overtones, such as the ‘Al-Aqsa in Danger’ rally.92 
According to the 2015 survey, 43 percent of Israeli Arabs sympathize in some 
way with the Islamic Movement. Among those, twice as many identify with 
the Northern Branch over the Southern Branch.93 
Through a series of initiatives in various social, religious, and cultural spheres 
undertaken by the Islamic Movement, Israel’s Arab population became 
increasingly Islamized.94 The Movement’s operations took place in religion, 
infrastructure, healthcare, charity, education, sports, culture, and arts 
combined to create ‘a unique Islamic identity for the Arab population of Israel’ 
95. At the same time, the Movement operated with the restrictive condition of 
the constant threat of impending actions against it. Still, its organizations and 
initiatives were effective in providing essential services to its communities, 
and patiently, gradually, but persistently advanced its goals. 
The Politicization and Conservation of Islamic Sites
To this day, the most fervently disputed issue in Israel is the Arabs’ struggle 
for land. Estimates show that up to 70 percent of land may have been 
expropriated from Arab citizens and turned into national land.96 Thus it is 
worth examining the Islamic Movement’s attempts to reclaim sacred places 
in the context of the wider Arab struggle for land and for the rights of Arab 
communities.97 Regarding the conservation of Islamic sites, the Northern 
Branch has benefited from the state’s consistent neglect and misuse of these 
sites. The Movement has diligently identified, documented, and sought to 
protect, clean and renovate Islamic sites not only in Muslim communities but 
throughout the country. The defence of these sites has allowed the Movement 
to revive Arabs’ Islamic religious heritage as well as position itself as the main 
force driving this project,98 despite considerable state resistance. The Islamic 
Movement has used sacred places to expand its circle of supporters and to 
visibly demonstrate the recently strengthened identity of the Muslim minority 
in Israel. The Northern Branch’s leaders have learned ‘that sacred places are 
able to evoke [intense reactions] from diverse groups in support of political, 
religious, and other causes’.99 
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The association between a place 
and society can be summed up by 
the following: ‘Place is a space to 
which meaning has been ascribed’.100 
Further, ‘the significance and 
symbols attributed to a place are at 
the heart of contests over control, 
over meaning, and over the manner 
in which a place is understood. This 
is the reason that contests over … 
a place plays a material role in all 
cultural struggles for autonomy, 
control, and self-determination’.101 
The Islamic Movement’s use of place 
has its origins in the 1970s writings 
of Sheikh Darwish, whose careful 
rhetoric promoted a non-violent 
struggle to achieve national goals 
which included sensitive issues 
such as sacred places. In the 1980s, 
Salah, now ‘one of the main forces 
in shaping the Movement’s position 
regarding land’, joined him.102 
Around the same time, Kamil Rayyan 
began documenting, conserving, 
and renovating Islamic cemeteries 
and mosques, and negotiated with 
official state institutions over the 
Arabs’ rights to these places.103 In 
conjunction with Rayyan’s efforts, 
Salah uses the status of these 
sacred places and particularly the 
compound in Jerusalem to bolster 
the Northern Branch’s public 
standing. Since becoming head of the 
Northern Branch, Salah has held the 
popular annual ‘Al-Aqsa in Danger’ 
convention and rally.104 The emotive 
slogans and activities accompanying 
this project have elevated Al-Aqsa’s 
significance and transformed it into 
a national symbol. Salah’s efforts in 
this regard have gained support even 
from non-Muslims and others who 
are not affiliated with the Islamic 
Movement.105 The Northern Branch 
promotes the transformation of land 
into Islamic sacred places, thereby 
precluding Jewish ownership. The 
Movement’s leaders know that this 
tactic allows them to make gains in 
the struggle for land ownership and 
at the same time exploit it to recruit 
supporters for the Movement. 
The Banishment of the Northern 
Branch
On 17th November 2015, Israel 
outlawed the entire Northern 
Branch of the Islamic Movement 
on charges of inciting the ‘Third 
Intifada’ or ‘Stabbing Intifada’ 
surrounding the issue of the Al-Aqsa 
Mosque.106 Within Israel, opinions 
differ regarding the reasons for the 
outbreak of violence. Several Israeli 
Defense Force generals have stated 
that it is an expression of anger and 
revenge due to frustrations over the 
stagnation of diplomatic progress,107 
while the Israeli intelligence services 
have reported that the violence 
has its roots in Israeli Arabs’ 
‘feelings of national, economic and 
personal deprivation’.108 The official 
government statement on the issue 
is that ‘the organization threatens 
public order, incites violence and 
racism, colludes with Hamas and 
harasses Jewish and non-Muslim 
citizens who want to visit the Temple 
Mount’.109 Somewhat ironically, the 
Arab Israeli public now perceives 
the Northern Branch as a victim, 
and many Arab community leaders 
and politicians have rallied around 
Ra’ed Salah. The controversy of the 
Northern Branch’s outlawing seems 
to have boosted Salah’s stature and 
that of the organization.110 To be sure, 
Salah and other Islamic Movement 
leaders will know how to use this to 
their advantage.
Analysis & Conclusions
In the introductory section, it was 
established that a socio-political 
enterprise must have all of the 
following attributes: assumption of 
risk and/or uncertainty; innovation; 
autonomy in decision-making; 
leadership; supplying capital; 
involvement in social development; 
demonstrable cooperation of society; 
dependency-provision cycle; and a 
combination of political and social 
objectives, formal or informal. In order 
to determine whether the Northern 
Branch of the Islamic Movement 
in Israel constitutes an example of 
socio-political entrepreneurship, it 
is necessary to examine each of these 
elements in turn. 
a) Assumption of risk and/or 
uncertainty – For the Northern 
Branch, the most obvious risk is the 
prosecution and incarceration of 
its leaders and other members for 
activities the state deems illegal. 
Sheikh Ra’ed Salah and other 
leaders have assumed responsibility 
for this risk several times and served 
jail sentences of multiple years. 
Another risk is the banishment 
of the entire enterprise, which 
means that any activity related 
to the Northern Branch is illegal; 
this risk was realized in November 
2015. A third risk might entail 
repercussions for the Israeli Arab 
community. It seems, however, that 
for the Northern Branch these risks, 
albeit setbacks, have contributed to 
greater community support for its 
objectives, which adds to its profit 
accumulation in the long term.
b) Innovation – The Northern Islamic 
Movement shares many attributes 
of other Islamic movements in 
the region, notably in terms of 
ideology, organizational structures, 
and operational mechanisms. As 
it is modelled after the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Northern Branch 
has similar slogans, ideologies, and 
participation avenues. However, 
the Islamic Movement in Israel 
distinguishes itself from other 
movements in terms of the context 
in which it operates. First, it may 
be enough of a distinction that an 
Islamist movement can exist at all 
in the Jewish state of Israel. The 
Islamic Movement has been allowed 
to operate within the legal confines 
of the state, both as a political party 
and as a movement, which is unlike 
many other Islamist organizations 
in neighbouring states which 
suffered repression by authoritarian 
regimes. More importantly, the 
Northern Islamic Movement is, 
and functions as, much more than 
a political party. It sees its struggle 
as part of the larger ummah (trans-
national society of Muslims) which 
is not confined to Israel alone. It 
has worked industriously, through 
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its rhetoric, activities, and services, to develop its ability to operate and 
proselytise at the social level, which has challenged previous Arab Israeli 
identity and has provided a new one in its place. In this way, the Islamic 
Movement distinguishes itself from other similar movements.
c) Autonomy in decision-making – The Northern Branch is autonomous of the 
state, managing itself and developing and implementing its goals through 
its independent leadership and the work of the citizens who support the 
Movement. Although the Movement has in most ways sought to operate 
within the legal framework of the state, it has freely formulated its positions 
and activities. 
d) Leadership – Ra’ed Salah and others have taken on clear leadership roles in 
the Islamic Movement by organising resources and volunteers to advance 
its goals. Their rhetoric concerning Islamic sites has placed the Northern 
Branch in a leadership position among the Israeli Arabs in the struggle 
for land, and various Branch initiatives have led the community towards a 
stronger Arab identity.
e) Supplying capital -- As outlined in detail in previous sections, the Islamic 
Movement operates its various functions and provides its services primarily 
with funds collected by its charity groups, donations of supplies and 
tools, and through structured volunteer work, all of which constitute the 
Movement’s capital. This capital is invested into the community, and profit 
may be measured in terms of the degree of Arab Israeli communities’ support 
for the movement, and therefore for its short- and long-term goals. Greater 
community support indicates greater profit for the Movement.
f) Involvement in social development – The Northern Islamic Movement 
certainly has aimed to benefit the Israeli Arab society in which it operates. 
It has done so through the tangible work on roads, schools, mosques, 
graveyards, etc., through the provision of health, religious, and educational 
services. It has also done so through the less tangible nurturing of a stronger, 
more robust Arab and Muslim identity, which the Movement has viewed as 
a crucial way in which it has benefited Israeli Arabs.
g) Demonstrable cooperation of society – The various volunteer groups 
that the Northern Branch organises, as well as its proselytizing activities, 
enthusiastically encourage community engagement, particularly of the 
youth. Due to the Branch’s reliance on volunteerism in its programmes, it 
could not, in fact, function as it does without the high degree of Arab Israeli 
society’s participation in its endeavours. 
h) A combination of political and social objectives, formal or informal – The 
Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement certainly has both social and 
political objectives. Its short-term objective has been to alleviate Israeli Arabs’ 
social deficits by providing various crucial services, described previously, to 
the Arab communities in Israel, and combines political elements with its 
services (such as the restoration of 
Islamic sites which is also a struggle 
for land). The long-term objective 
is certainly political, the goal being 
to establish a self-sufficient Arab 
community and perhaps expand 
this to independent statehood.
i) An element of a dependency-
provision cycle with society – The 
Northern Islamic Movement has 
established a dependency-provision 
cycle. It identified the various needs 
of the community that the state of 
Israel failed to provide, and has 
become one of the main, if not the 
primary, provider of services which 
alleviate those needs or constitute 
an alternative more favourable to 
the Arab community. As such, the 
community has become dependent 
on the Movement’s services while 
the Movement is dependent on 
the community for its continued 
support of Movement objectives 
and activities.
As shown above, the Northern 
Islamic Movement fully meets the 
socio-political entrepreneurship 
criteria outlined previously. Due 
to its effective ability to operate 
and proselytise at a social level and 
challenge notions of Arab identity in 
Israel, the Islamic Movement defies 
traditional politics in the context 
of Israeli Arabs. Its activities and 
ideology create a pressing conflict 
for the state as it struggles to find a 
mechanism to narrow the area where 
the Islamic Movement can operate 
without raising concerning questions 
on the ‘democratic’ character of 
Israel. Utilizing the new concept of 
socio-political entrepreneurship as 
an analytical framework has allowed 
for deeper and more meaningful 
understanding of the Northern Islamic 
Movement and its functions. Viewing 
the Movement from the perspective 
of socio-political entrepreneurship 
has permitted the study to 
circumvent traditional discussions 
which centre on zero-sum analyses, 
and allowed for the examination of 
an entrepreneurial movement which 
fits neither the category of political 
nor of social entrepreneurship 
entirely. The Movement’s objectives, 
functions, and mechanisms have 
instead become the focus and have 
been described more clearly.
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